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In the Supre111e Court 
of the State of Utah 
LA \VRENCE H. STRATFORD and 
ELLA L. STRATFORD, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
<;I~~ORGE G. WOOD and LEAH: C. 
WOOD, his wife, 
Defendan,ts and Appellants. 
Case No. 9198 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEI\1ENT OF rrHE CASE 
r:rhis suit was brought by Lawrence I-!. Stratford and 
l~lla L. Stratford, Respondents, to quiet title to Lots 11, 
12 and 13, Block 5, The Groves, in Emigration ·Canyon, 
together with damages for trespass by defendants on 
plaintiffs' lands. 
There was no dispute as to the fact that plaintiffs are 
and at all times material to this action were the owners 
of Lots 11, 12 and 13, Block 5, The Groves, but the ques-
tion in issue is, where on the ground is the South line of 
Lot 11, owned by plaintiffs, which is the North line of Lot 
10, owned by defendants. 
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Defendants answered setting up that they were en-
titled to the property heretofore occupied by them by 
right of adverse possession, but failed to adduce evidence 
sufficient to support this defense. 
Plaintiffs first employed :Mr. Robert A. Wilkins to 
survey the lots. Subsequently plaintiffs employed Bush 
and Gudgell to survey the lots. The Survey of Bush and 
Gudgell found the line dividing Lots 10 and 11 to be ap-
proximately 17 feet south of the dividing line as found 
by Mr. Wilkins. Defendants contended for the line as es-
tablished by Mr. Wilkins, and plaintiffs for the line estab-
lished by Bush and Gudgell. 
The case was sub1nitted to the jury on two Interro-
gatories: 
1. Which survey, the Wilkins or Gudgell survey, 
correctly shows the true boundary line between 
the land of plaintiffs and defendants. 
2. The amount of damages sustained by plaintiffs 
as a result of the use of plaintiffs' land by de-
fendants. 
The jury found that the Gudgell survey was correct and 
that plaintiffs are entitled to damages in the amount of 
$295.00. 
In order to pass upon the errors which Appellants 
assert were committed by the Trial Court, it is necessary 
to direct the attention of the Court to the evidence offered 
and received at the trial. This we shall do. 
George B. Gudgell was first called and testified in 
substance as follows: That he is a Consuting Civil Engin-
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t~Pr and Land Surveyor and ha~ been engaged in survey-
ing for about sixteen years. They surveyed Lots 11, 12 
and 13 in Block G of Groves Subdivision. (R. 13) He 
followed the official plat of rrhe Groves Subdivision. (Ex-
hibit ·1) (R. 13) His men found the section corner which 
was identified by two blazed trees and located the two 
county monurnents. He verified the correctness of the 
section corner with the two county monuments. (R. 15) 
He stated that: 
"vVe used our traverse down frmn the section 
corner, then went up and tied it to the plaintiffs' 
property and staked out or put his corner stakes 
in directly frorn the section corner." (R. 16) 
~xhibit 1 is a plat reflecting the location of these 
corners and it correctly reflects the location of the im-
provements, buildings, picnic areas and such as they are 
located on the land in relation to that corner. They tied 
in several fences as they went up the canyon. 
On cross examination :Mr. Gudgell was asked whether 
or not he did the surveying himself. He stated that the 
original survey he did not do himself, but when he found 
out the n1atter was going to court, he went up and checked 
the survey. He started at the county n1onuments. His 
men checked into ~he county 1nonu1nents and checked the 
corner n1onuments, so he started on those monuments. 
He did not start from the section corner himself. He did 
not show all the courses with all the distances set out on 
the map that he introduced first. (Exhibit 3) He ran a 
traverse line of his own up there. (R. 17) They calculated 
their traverse and calculated the corners, but they did 
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not run the courses of each angle and each distance set 
out on the map which had been introduced as Exhibit 4. 
He ran the courses and distances at the office, but not on 
the ground. (R. 18) They checked some of the fence lines 
on some of the lots as they went up for the purpose of 
determining whether or not the angles and distances set 
out in Exhibit 4 were correct. Surveyors and Engineers 
place great confidence in old established fence lines which 
show the angles and distances in various lots. (R. 18) He 
was asked to assume that there is more land in the area 
than is shown on the map Exhibit 4, and was asked 
whether the lots might fit going up, but coming down they 
might not fit. He stated that the Subdivision is tied to 
the one section corner only, and that is what he had to 
survey from. He checks fence lines and angles on lots to 
confirm the fact that the lot is correctly platted. (R.19) 
He was asked the following question and gave the follow-
ing answer: 
Q. "You do check your p.i.'s (point of intersec-
tion and your fence lines to determine 
whether or not the lots are correctly platted 
or correctly located on your plat, don't you~ 
A. "We check those to tell whether our lots are 
correctly-what we do is tie in with those 
things to see if as we go up there we have 
something to substantiate our survey. That is 
the reason for it." · 
If, upon such a check, a fence line which has been estab-
lished for twenty or thirty or forty years was twenty or 
thirty feet out, it would immediately raise the question as 
to whether or not the survey was correct. (R. 20) 
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On redirect exmnination .Mr. Gudgell testified that if 
he found a fence line substantially out, he would not 
change his survey according to the fence. He surveyed 
according to the deed description. (R. 20) He ran the 
survey line himself with two other rnen. (R. 21) He 
checked the fence or corner of Lot 2. His stake was west, 
or rather, south of the fence line about two feet at that 
point. (R. 21-22) 
On recross exarnination .Mr. Gudgell testified that he 
ran a traverse on each of the pieces of property from the 
starting point up to the Wood property, but a traverse 
is not run on each piece of property. (R. 23) 
On redirect examination he testified that running 
a traverse is the standard and customary manner of sur-
veying as against running each individual property line. 
That they usually traverse the easiest line and then calcu-
late where they are and calculate where the corners are 
when they get up close to the property and put the corners 
in frmn that. It is possible to achieve an accurate prop-
erty line in running a traverse in that manner. (R. 24) 
.Mr. Robert John Ketchurn wa8 then sworn and testi-
fied: That he is Vice-President of the Ketchum Builders 
Supply Company. (R. 27) If the sleeping cabin were 
removed, he could probably sell the same for $600.00, and 
the cost of rnoving it would probably be $400.00, leaving 
them a profit of $200.00. (R. 30) 
~Ir. Gordon C. Holt was then sworn and testified: 
That he is a Real Estate Broker and has been for about 
twenty years and is experienced in appraising property. 
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(R. 33-34) In the last five years he has had transactions 
involving two properties in Emigration Canyon and is 
familiar with the lots and values in Emigration Canyon. 
It is his opinion that Lot 11 has a value of $2500.00. He 
has had experience in leasing property. The rental value 
of property is usually based upon a capitalization of the 
value of the property. (R. 35) That a fair rental value 
of Lot 11 would be $21.00 a month. (R. 36) 
On cross examination he stated he could not tell of 
any sale in the area within the last five years of a 100-foot 
piece of property for $2500.00. (R. 37) He does not know 
of any rentals of vacant property ever having been made 
in Emigration Canyon. (R. 38) 
In answer to a question of the Court as to whether 
the witness thought that in the vicinity of the cabins on 
the property in question a vacant lot could be rented for 
any price for a short term, he stated he did not know. 
(R. 43) The Court stated he supposed that vacant sites 
in the canyon were of use to the public generally only 
when a cabin is built on it, to which witness answered 
"Yes". The Court asked him if he knew of any other 
use made of the sites, and he answered "No, sir." (R. 44) 
Plaintiff Ella L. Stratford was then called and testi-
fied as follows: That she is one of the owners of Lots 
11, ·12 and 13. The sleeping cabin on Lot 11 was erected 
in May or June, 1954, by defendant George Wood. (R. 45) 
In June of 1954 she and her husband and Mr. Wood had 
a conversation. Mr. Wood said, "I guess I have built on 
some of your land." (R. 46) Her husband asked why he 
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had done ~o. and he 1::\tated he didn't think that they \vould 
care. llPr husband told _Mr. \Vood to get the cabin off the 
land. ( R. -1: I) She told l\1r. \rood that if he didn't move 
his cabin, they would have it surveyed. (R. 48) vVhen 
asked on other occasions concerning the matter, Mr. 
\Vood would never give a definite answer, except to say 
"\VItere is your line?'' She couldn't say. She had conver-
sations with Mrs. Wood, but :Mrs. Wood would make no 
comment other than to say she would talk with her hus-
band and see what he says. (R. 48-49) 
On cross exa1nination she stated she told 1\Ir. Wood 
that the whole area involved in the suit was their land; 
that about 25 or 30 years ago they had had the land sur-
veyed, but she couldn't tell where the surveyor fixed the 
line. (R. 50) The only tin1e that she talked about any 
survey or stakes with 1\{r. Wood was in 1954 when she 
asked Mr. Wood to remove the cabin from her land. (R. 
51) 
_Mr. Lawrence H. Stratford was then called and testi-
fied: He is one of the plaintiffs in the action and one of 
the owners of Lots 11, 12 and 13. The sleeping cabin was 
erected in the forepart of June, 1954, by Mr. Wood. (R. 
51) In the forepart of June, 1954, he, l\1rs. Stratford and 
Mr. \Vood had a conversation. At that time Mr. Wood 
was just finishing the cabin. vVhen the conversation first 
started nlr. Wood said, "Strat, I guess I built on your 
property, but I didn't think you would care." He told Mr. 
\Yood that he wanted him to get off the property. Mr. 
\Vood stated that he wouldn't know where the line was, 
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and Mr. Stratford asked him why he didn't get it sur-
veyed. (R. 52) Witness stated that he had had two sur-
veys of the property made, one by Mr. Wilkins and the 
second by Bush & Gudgell. He paid Mr. Wilkins $205.34 
for making the survey and gave a check to Bush and Gud-
gell for $480.00 for the later survey. The two checks 
were introduced into evidence as Exhibits 8 and 9. (R. 53) 
Objection was made to the introduction of the checks for 
any purpose other than to fix the date thereon, on the 
ground that the same were immaterial. The Court over-
ruled the objections. (R. 54) Mr. Stratford stated that 
neither he nor his family ever used the sleeping cabin nor 
had they used the picnic area. (R. 54) 
Plaintiff rested. 
Mr. Robert A. Wilkins was then called to testify. He 
stated he was 72 years of age. He has been engaged in 
engineering since 1913 and as a licensed engineer and 
survyor. (R. 56) He has been a surveyor since 1915, and 
was qualified in the mining business and became a United 
States Mineral Surveyor and practiced the patenting of 
mining claims for eight years in the Tintic Mining Dis-
trict. In August or September, 1956, at the request of 
Mr. Stratford he surveyed Lots 10, 11, 12 and 13, and that 
he recently rechecked the survey of those lots to deter-
mine where the south line of Mr. Stratford's property is. 
At the request of Mr. Wood he rechecked his survey 
made for Mr. Stratford and went carefully over all of the 
deeds and the abstract from the beginning of the survey, 
The (troves, taking the courses and distances on each side 
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ol' the lane, which is called Burr's Lane. (R. 57) Witness 
wa~ n~kPd the following question and gave the following 
answer: 
Q. "Did I understand yon correcty to say that 
von started down at the south end and went 
~lp the courses and distances of each course 
and distance until you got up to the property 
that belonged to Mr. Stratford~" 
A. "I did, and I didn't only take one side. I took 
both sides because the courses and distances 
are different on the turning point and in that 
way I was able to see how these lots fit in. 
If you study this map you will see that the 
pattern is definite and all the way up there 
and there are so Inany lots that have to be put 
in between these turning points, and even if 
you were just a careful observer you will get 
on to that pattern and you cannot go very far 
wrong." (R. 58-59) 
He stated that he determined where the south line of Mr. 
Stratford's property is following the courses and dis-
tances and drove an iron pipe to mark the point. (R. 59) 
That the sleeping cabin is 10.7 feet from a line drawn 
from the peg fixed by the witness as being on the south 
line of the Stratford property. (R. 60) He has checked 
against the courses and distances with the monuments 
that are on the side of the road, that is, fences and other 
monuments. (R. 61) 
He identified Exhibit D 13 as a map made for Mr. 
Stratford. (R. 62) He found that there was more ground 
than the lots called for. (R. 63) He started at the south 
end and measured each distance and each course up the 
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whole area up to the Stratford property trying to fit in 
the various lots that are shown on the map, Exhibit D13. 
(R. 64) He measured the distance between his line and 
the line that was fixed by the stakes of Bush & Gudgell, 
and it was a distance of about 19 feet. (R. 64) The line 
as fixed by him ran 10.8 feet from the sleeping cabin. 
(R. 65) The Bush & Gudgell line is 19 feet south of the 
line drawn by the witness. (R. 66) 
On cross examination Mr. Wilkins testified: He used 
the southeast corner of Lot 13 as the starting point for 
the beginning of his survey. (R. 70) That there was a 
monument at the intersection of the fences on Lot 13. The 
fence is still there, it is well identified with a 2x2x10 
foot high monument. In making the survey in 1937 he 
located a sandstone monument, but when he made his 
survey for Mr. Stratford in 1956 he did not find the sand-
stone monument. He used the same beginning point be-
cause the fence was still in place. (R. 71) He had started 
from the point, which, from his recollection, was the loca-
tion on which the sandstone monument had been, and it 
is his belief and his understanding that that was the best 
possible point because it was right on the eompany 
ground and their own fence and the beginning of private 
lots. (R. 72) He saw but did not use the section corner. 
The county monuments did not have a bearing on the sur-
vey. (R. 72) He did not attempt in 1956 to locate the sec-
tion corner. He took the line of the fence near the start-
ing point and went into the lot a certain distance and then 
turned the angle to the call of the Deed. He ran traverse 
lines. He turned his angle from the compass and then 
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checked fro1n the backside of the con1pass to check that he 
wa~ correct. (R. 75) He always reads the c01npass as a 
check with the horizontal angle, and he read the vertical 
angle for distances. In 1naking this survey he was going 
up a hill. (R. 77) He told Mr. Gudgell and Mr. Brayton 
and Counsel for plaintiff that he turned his angles with 
the c01npass and checked it by taking the reverse side of 
the compass. That is a check he always uses. He read the 
horizontal angle each time. lie set up points and turned 
the angle, then read the cmnpass to see that an error 
could not creep in. In setting his beginning course he 
used the course of the fence on Lot 13. (R. 78) The road 
leaves Burr's Lane as it is platted in many instances. It 
is crowded over to the east side. (R. 81) He had run a 
traverse line in getting up to the property. It is standard 
practice for surveyors to run a traverse line. (R. 82) 
:Mr. George G. Wood was then called and testified: 
He is one of the defendants in the action. (R. 84) He 
moved on to the property in 1943. The area between his 
cabin and the bunk house consists of two patios. Most 
of the rock work on the patios had been built in the 20's. 
At one time there was lawn put in, but it wouldn't grow, 
so shale was put on the area. Mr. Whitney sank his septic 
tank right beneath the east patio. The west patio is 
about fifteen feet long and about ten feet wide. Mr. Whit-
ney had put cement on that and built up walls on the side. 
It was built in 1924. The boy's initials are still there in 
the cement. Just north of the lower patio Mr. Whitney 
has a little shack which is used for a tool shed now, but 
which used to house an electrical generator which gener-
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a ted electricity for his house. (R. 85) The shed was lo-
cated where the bunk house is now located. The shed was 
moved over to make way for the bunk house. There has 
been no enlargement of the patios since witness moved in 
in 1943. On the upper patio witness had put a table and 
some stools around the table which seat seventeen people. 
The table is round and built of cement. The hunk house 
was built in 1956 or 1954. (R. 86) Mr. Stratford said that 
he thought the bunk house had been built on his (Strat-
oord's) property, and to move it off. Witness stated he 
did not recall saying that he guessed he had built on 
Stratford's land. (R. 87) Mrs. Stratford stated that the 
bunk house was on her property. He measured from the 
upper line or big gate on Mr. Stratford's property 100 
feet south. So measuring, Mr. Stratford's south line 
would be north of the bunk house about eighteen to twenty 
feet! (R. 88) The land immediately north of the bunk 
house dips down into a little creek that drains plaintiffs' 
spring. (R. 89) 
On cross examination Mr. Wood stated he did not 
have a survey made before building the bunk house. He 
had recently had a survey made by Mr. Wilkins. (R. 89) 
Also that he had had l\!Ir. Arnold Coon survey the prop-
erty. That the line fixed by Mr. Coon was "pretty close 
to the line fixed by Mr. Gudgell, about two inches differ-
ent." He went out with Mr. Coon when he found the sec-
tion corner. He didn't make a survey from the section 
corner down. He started from the county monuments 
and he checked out within two inches of the line shown on 
plaintiffs' Exhibit 1. (R. 90) Mr. Coon did not follow each 
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<·ounH· as .Mr. Wilkins did. lie had not had 1\lr. Coon 
elteek with the vVilkins' survey to find out if there was 
anything wrong with it. (R. 91) The sleeping cabin is 
about twenty feet long. (R. 93) In Ineasuring the Strat-
ford propcrt~T' witness started at the edge of the road 
where .Mr. Stratford's gate is Ineasured down 100 feet. 
(H. ~)[>) .Mr. Whitney did not ever show him a property 
line. The cabin on the \Voods' property was built in 1909 
b~· .Mr. Whitney, and :Mr. Whitney told him the south 
line was about two or three feet south of the cabin. Mr. 
\Vhitney told him he had put his septic tank under the 
patio. He found the tank north of the house. Until the 
lawsuit caine up, witness had no idea where the property 
line was and no one has ever told him. (R. 100) 
Defendants rested. 
Plaintiffs recalled :Mr. Gudgell who testified as fol-
lows: He heard Nir. Wilkins testify that he made the be-
ginning point of his survey at what he thought had for-
merly been a location of a standstone monument. The 
witness surveyed that monu1nent and tied in to the fence 
line from which Mr. Wilkins started. His calculation was 
within three feet of the line found by J\t1r. Wilkins. (R. 
103) The use of a transit gives a closer check on an angle 
than just using the compass and if there is any Inetal 
close to the compass or a car parked close to the -transit 
when it is set up, it can vary the needle quite a bit. (R. 
106) A metal pencil in the surveyor's pocket may make 
a difference of three or four degrees. If there is error 
in turning an angle, it will throw off the findings in reach-
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ing a point. (R.107) Such an error in going north would 
have a tendency to throw the survey off more east and 
west than north and south. (R. 108) 
Arnold W. Coon was then sworn and testified in re-
buttal for plaintiffs. He is a licensed engineer and land 
surveyor. He was asked to check the survey made by 
Mr. GudgelL In the interest of economy, he suggested 
getting together with Mr. Gudgell and checking the calcu~ 
lations that he had made and to go up on the site with 
the man who had done the actual field work for Bush & 
Gudgell and check his procedures and then give an in-
dependent opinion as to whether he thought the method 
and mathematics they had used were valid or not. 
On objection of counsel for defendants that the wit-
ness' testimony was not rebuttal, the Court sustained the 
objection as to any computation which Mr. Gudgell had 
made, but stated that he could testify as to anything that 
he had checked on Mr. Wilkins' work. 
The witness stated that he was later retained to go 
up with instruments and courses and determine the loca-
tion of Bush & Gudgell's point in respect to the Wilkins' 
point. (R. 111) He tied them in and found that there 
was a difference of 17.2 feet north and south between the 
two surveys. (R. 112-113) The witness was asked the 
following questions and gave the following answer: 
Q. "Have you made any independent check of the 
procedures made by or taken by Mr. Wilkins 1 
Do you know what procedures he followed~" 
A. "No. The only thing I had was a copy of a 
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map that he had drawn of that area, but I 
have never talked to 1\fr. Wilkins, and any-
thing that I have concerning his procedures 
or n1ethods or calculations would be strictly 
hearsay." 
rrhe witness was then asked the following question: 
Q. "Based upon your own calculations of the lo-
cation of that corner, is it your opinion that 
the Wilkins' location of that corner is correct 
or incorrect~" 
'ro which the same objection was made. The Court then 
stated that he could answer whether in his opinion the 
\Vilkins' survey was incorrect. He answered "Yes, our 
survey would indicate that the Wilkins' survey is in-
correct." 
On cross exmnination the witness stated that he used 
the county monuments that are in existence on the 
grounds as a starting point and ran a complete and inde-
pendent survey so that he had the information concerning 
Gudgell's traverse, but he did not run the courses along 
Burr Avenue. In answer to question by the Court as to 
·why he did not run the courses along Burr A venue, he 
stated that it would necessitate cutting down trees to 
make such a survey. The Court asked him if he got on to 
a line so that he could see whether there were any trees 
in his way, to which he answered, "No." (R.l16) 
.Mr. Edwin Whitney was called to testify on behalf 
of the plaintiff, but at the conclusion of his testimony, 
the Court ordered all of his testimony stricken. 
Both parties then rested. 
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The Court orally instructed the jury and counsel 
argued the case to the jury. Counsel for the defendants 
in arguing the matter, attempted to argue that the fact 
that the area between the Gudgell survey line and the 
Wilkins survey line had been occupied in connection with 
the Wood property for 35 years and had been occupied 
by Mr. Wood from 1943 to the time of commencing the ac-
tion without question, was evidence that the Wilkins sur-
vey was correct. On objection of counsel for the plain-
tiff, the Court refused to permit counsel for the defendant 
to discuss such evidence, which ruling counsel assigned 
as prejudicial error. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Appellants argue this appeal on the following points: 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT COUN-
SEL FOR DEFENDANTS TO ARGUE THAT THE FACT 
THAT THE AREA BETWEEN THE GUDGELL SURVEY 
LINE AND THE WILKINS SURVEY LINE HAD BEEN USED 
AND OCCUPIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE WOOD 
PROPERTY FOR 35 YEARS AND BY DEFENDANTS FROM 
1943 UNTIL 1954 WITHOUT QUESTION, WAS EVIDENCE 
THA'T THE WILKINS SURVEY WAS CORRECT. (R. 138-140) 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE WITNESS 
COON, OVER THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL, TO STATE 
HIS OPINION THAT THE WILKINS SURVEY WAS IN-
CORRECT. (R. 114) 
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POINT THREE 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
THIRTEEN AND EACH SUBDIVISION THEREOF. 
ARGUl\1ENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT COUN-
SEL FOR DEFENDANTS TO ARGUE THAT THE FACT 
THAT THE AREA BETWEEN THE GUDGELL SURVEY 
LINE AND THE WILKINS SURVEY LINE HAD BEEN USED 
AND OCCUPIED IN CONNECTION WITH THE WOOD 
PROPERTY FOR 35 YEARS AND BY DEFENDANTS FROM 
1943 UNTIL 1954 WITHOUT QUESTION, WAS EVIDENCE 
THAT THE WILKINS SURVEY WAS CORRECT. (R. 138-140) 
The 1nain issue in this case is whether the boundary 
line fixed by Wilkins or the line fixed by Gudgell is cor-
rect. The \V ood property, Lot 10, lies south of the Strat-
ford property, Lots 11, 12 and 13. The Gudgellline runs 
east and west a few feet north of the Wood cabin which 
was built in 1909. The Wilkins' line parallels the Gudgell 
line and is 17.2 feet north of the Gudgell line. (R.112) 
The sleeping cabin built by 1fr. Wood in 1954 is 10.7 feet 
north of the Wilkins boundary line. (R. 60) The area 
between the two survey lines was used by Mr. Whitney, 
.Jir. \Vood's predecessor in title, during the 1920's and 
1930's. He built two patios of cement with walls in the 
area behveen the two survey lines, and put his septic tank 
first beneath the east patio. l\1r. Whitney deeded to Mr. 
Stevenson in January, 1941. (Ex. P-10) Mr. Stevenson 
deeded to I\1r. \Vood in August, 1943. (Ex. P-12) Mr. 
\Y ood built a round table on the westerly of the two 
patios, built a lazy susan on the table and stools for seven-
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teen people around the table. (R. 86) This patio is fifteen 
feet long and ten feet wide. The area between the two 
survey lines is indispensible to whoever uses the Wood 
cabin. The occupants of the Wood cabin have always used 
the area north to the general area of the Wilkins line. 
Mrs. Stratford testified that 25 or 30 years ago they 
had the property surveyed. No question of the use of the 
area north of the Wood's cabin to the Wilkins line was 
ever raised by the Stratfords. It was not until Mr. Wood 
built the sleeping cabin 10.7 feet north of the Wilkins 
line in 1954 that the Stratfords complained that he was on 
their property. Then as Mrs. Stratford testified, "He 
was told to get the cabin off the land." (R. 47) She also 
testified she told Mrs. 1N ood that the sleeping cabin was 
on "our" (Stratford) property, and "they wanted it off.'' 
(R. 48) She further testified: 
"The only time I talked about any survey or 
stakes was in 1954 when I asked Mr. Wood to re-
move the 'sleeping' cabin in the area from our 
land." (R. 44) 
In none of the conversations did the Stratfords claim 
the area between the Gudgell and Wilkins survey lines. 
Apparently the first time the Stratfords saw the sleeping 
cabin they complained that it was on their land. They 
then laid no clai1n to the area south of the Wilkins line. 
The conclusion seems obvious that the line established 
by the surveyor whom Mrs. Stratford testified surveyed 
the land for them 25 or 30 years ago was approximately 
the sarne line that Mr. vVilkins found when he surveyed 
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for the Stratfords for they apparently considered the line 
to be approximately there. 
The foregoing facts appellants were not permitted 
to argue. These facts should hardly be clearly in the 
minds of the jurors because all of the evidence on the 
foregoing nmtters had gone in piecemeal and the jury 
eould not be expected to appreciate the significance of 
the evidence unless it was argued to them. 
Furthermore, in denying appellants the right to 
argue this all iluportant part of their case, the Court 
in effect told the jury they could not consider such evi-
dence. 
The effect of an erroneous ruling on the matter of 
permitting Counsel to argue evidence to the jury was 
considered in the case of Givans v. Chi. St. P. M. & 0. Ry. 
Co., 56 N.W. (2d) 300, ______ Minn ....... , 38 A.L.R. 1393. In 
that case the Court said : 
"Where at the opening of a court's charge the 
jurors were told by the court that arguments of 
counsel are unnecessary and need not be given, the 
fundan1ental i1nportance of such arguments is 
thereby so minimized in the minds of the jurors 
that the resulting prejudice and error cannot 
reasonably be cured by belatedly permitting argu-
ments to be made at the close of the charge. Under 
the circumstances here existing the making of an 
argument at the close of the charge would have 
appeared to the jurors as an unimportant and un-
warranted encroachment upon their time and as 
being permitted only with the reluctant consent 
of the judge to whom they looked for guidance."' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
The statement of this Court 1n Jo-seph v. W. H. 
Groves L.D.S. Hospital, 318 P.(2d) 330, 7 Utah (2d) 39, 
applies in this case : 
"This emphasizes the importance of accord-
ing plaintiff's counsel the opportunity of perform-
ing one of his essential functions, that of arguing 
his case to the jury. In doing so, he should be per-
mitted to refer to and use all of the competent 
evidence he has marshalled and presented in the 
trial and to explain its meaning and argue its 
signifinance to a client's cause. 
"Some indication of the importance of the 
error with which we are here concerned is to be 
found in the fact that counsel thought the matter 
of sufficient consequence that he objected to the 
reading and use of the evidence in the argument 
to the jury. It strikes the writer as being some-
what inconsistent that Counsel now urges that 
depriving plaintiff of the use of such evidence is 
merely harmless error. If it is so plain that it 
would not have helped plaintiff's case, one is lead 
to wonder why counsel made the objection and 
insisted that it not be used. The obvious answer 
seems to be that defendant's counsel was actually 
apprehensive that it may have a substantial effect 
against his client. Of course, he could not be sure, 
nor can we. 
"In view of the fact that there is such sub-
stantial doubt that we cannot, with any degree of 
assurance, affirm that the use of such evidence 
would not have been helpful to plaintiff, the doubt 
should be resolved in favor of allowing him to 
have a full and fair presentation of his cause to 
the jury." 
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1 n the ca~e at bar (;ounsel for plaintiff objected to 
appt>llant~· Counsel arguing the foregoing facts, and the 
{ •ourt ~ustained the objection in the presence of the jury. 
In 88 C.J.S., page 330, Section 165, it is said: 
"\Vhere tht>re is an issue in the case to be sub-
mitted to the jury, and he is not in default, a party 
litigant has a right to have his case fully and 
fairly argued to the jury, even though facts may 
appear plain to the court." 
The other evidence in this n1atter on the most iin-
portant issue in the case of the correct location of the 
boundary line would not preponderate in favor of either 
side to any great degree, and the argument which de-
fendants' ·Counsel was not permitted to make was, there-
fore, of great iinportance to appellants, and constituted 
serious prejudicial error. 
POINT TWO 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE WITNESS 
COON, OVER THE OBJECTION OF COUNSEL, TO STATE 
HIS OPINION THAT THE WILKINS SURVEY WAS IN-
CORRECT. (R.l14) 
When witness Coon started to testify that he had 
cheeked Gudgell's procedures, Counsel for Appellants 
objected that his evidence was not rebuttal. The Court 
sustained the objection as to anything Gudgell had done, 
but stated he would pennit Coon to testify to anything he 
checked on Wilkins. (R. 110-111) . Coon was asked the 
following questions and gave the following answers: 
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Q. "Have you made any independent check of 
procedures made by or taken by Mr. Wilkins 1 
Do you know what procedures he followed~" 
A. "No. The only thing I had was a copy of a 
map that he had drawn of that area, but I 
have never talked with l\fr. Wilkins, and any-
thing that I have concerning his procedures 
or methods of calculations would be strictly 
hearsay." 
Q. "Based upon your own calculation of the lo-
cation of that corner, is it your opinion that 
the Wilkins' location of that corner is correct 
or incorrect~" 
To this question Counsel objected that the question was 
leading, suggestive and calling for a conclusion which 
was not the province of the witness, but the province of 
the jury. The objection was overruled. (R. 113) 
The witness did not directly answer the question, but 
subsequently was asked the following question: 
"And in your opinion of the two surveys, your 
professional opinion would he that the Wilkins' 
survey is incorrect f' 
To this Counsel made the same objection as heretofore 
stated. The Court then stated: 
"Well, he may answer as to whether in his 
opinion the Wilkins' survey is incorrect." 
Witness then rnade the following answer: 
"Yes, our survey would indicate that the 
Wilkins' survey is incorrect." (R. 114) 
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lt will be noted that thi~ opinion "that the Wilkins' sur-
vey is incorrect," is an opinion on the credibility of the 
testimony of Mr. Wilkins. 
Counsel is aware of the position of this Court on the 
matter of adrnissibility of opinion evidence on the rnatter 
directly before the jury to decide. This Court has follow-
ed the reasoning of Wigrnore and :McCormick. We submit 
the following statement frorn III cCormick on Evidence, 
pages 25-26, as applicable to the n1atter now before this 
Court: 
"Undoubtedly there is a kind of statement by 
the witness which arnounts to little more than an 
expression of his belief as to how the case should 
be decided, or as to the arnount of damages which 
should be given, or as to the credibiUy of certa~n 
testimony. Such extreme expressions as these all 
courts, it is believed, would exclude. There is no 
necessity for such evidence and to receive it would 
tend to suggest that the judge and jury may shift 
responsibility for decision to the witness .... 
''The opposite view (the view that expert 
testimony is always adrnissible even though it 
directly bears upon the ultimate issue) would en-
tirely discard the rule that mere coincidence with 
an ultimate issue is a ground for exclusion of a 
witness's opinion or conclusion. It is doubtful 
if any court has found it expedient to go so far, 
but this is the view of Wigmore, and is the one 
embodied in the unifonn rules. Probably Wigmore 
would have conceded that the extreme instances 
rnentioned above of opinions as to how the case 
should be decided and the like should be excluded 
as impolitic and superfluous and there is real 
doubt that a judge trained in the common law 
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tradition in a state which has adopted the uniform 
rules would exclude such opinions under Rule 45, 
on the ground that their value is outweighed by a 
'substantial danger of undue prejudice or of con-
fused issues or of misleading the jury.' " 
POINT THREE 
THE .COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NO. 
THIRTEEN AND EACH SUBDIVISION THEREOF. 
Counsel took exception to Instruction No. 13, which 
in substance stated as follows: 
" (a) That plain tiffs are entitled to recover an 
amount representing reasonable rental 
value of the property used by defendants; 
" (b) . The reasonable cost of removing structures 
built upon the land less the salvage value 
thereof; and 
" (c) One-half of the cost of making a survey of 
the land." 
As to the first portion of the Instruction, objection 
was made upon the ground that the only evidence in the 
case was to the effect that such property had no rental 
value. Plaintiffs' only witness to this matter, Mr. Holt, 
stated in answer to a statement frmn the Court: 
Q. "I suppose these sites up there are of use to 
the public generally only when a cabin is built 
on them." 
A. "Yes." (R.44) 
The Court then offered to change the Instruction to 
provide only that the damages should be assessed one-
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half of the Wilkins' survey cost if the vVilkins survey is 
adopted, or one-half of the Gudgell survey, if the Gudgell 
survey is adopted. (R.143) However, the Court did not 
change the Instruction. 
The ·Court also 1nade the observation that since the 
building is worth the amount of removal of it, that the 
second portion of the question might be taken from the 
jury. (R. 143) This leaves only the third portion of the 
question, which the Court would not concede, was erron-
eous. The third portion was the awarding of one-half 
of the cost incurred in making a surven. 
Based on this Instruction the jury found in favor of 
plaintiffs for the amount of $295.00. 
As stated in 15 C.J. 124, Sections 271-2: 
"According to the weight of authority the ex-
pense of procuring surveys, maps, plats or plans 
is not taxable as costs unless there is a clear statu-
tory authority therefor." 
We do not have any statutory authority for assessing 
survey expenses as costs. 
The case of We.Vss v. Meyer, 32 P. 1025, 24 Ore. 108, 
is in point. In this case the Court stated: 
"Was there error of the trial court in refusing 
to allow an iten1 of $75.00 claimed to have been 
paid by the defendant for surveying and making 
a plat of the ground in controversy. We are clear-
ly of the opinion that this item was no more neces-
sary as a 'disbursement' than clerical services in 
the preparation of the pleadings or the board and 
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expenses of himself or counsel while attending the 
trial or any other expense incident to a trial and 
for which the law does not contemplate there 
should be a charge against the adverse party~" 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the judgment upon the verdict 
of the jury appealed from should be reversed, and a new 
trial ordered, and appellants awarded their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~10FFAT, IVERSON AND ELGGREN 
1311 Walker Bank Building, 
Salt Lake City 11, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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